

Sybil Attack Detection and Recovery Using Immune Collaborative Model in WSN

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Abstract

WSNs are composed of a large number of sensor nodes, which communicate in a radio channel. The main aim of the network consists of a sensing a certain physical variable, gathering data and forwarding them to the base station where the information is processed for further purposes. When any node create multiple copies of itself to create confusion in the WSN network or illegally claims multiple identities or claims fake ID'S and also can cause collapse in the network then that kind of situation can be referred as Sybil attack. This system can attack both internally and externally in which external attacks can be restricted by authentication but not internal attacks. The biological immune system is a robust, complex, adaptive system that defends the body from foreign pathogens. It is able to categorize all cells (or molecules) within the body as self-cells or non-self cells. It does this with the help of a distributed task force that has the intelligence to take action from a local and also a global perspective using its network of chemical messengers for communication. The proposed algorithm applies the Sybil attack detection and recovery using the proposed immune collaborative model. The proposed model consists of Immune Body that can combine to form Immune collaborative Body. It also defines the structure of IB as well as ICB. And the search and the exit criteria for any IB to join and exit any ICB. The immune algorithm applied to the model is the clonal selection algorithm. The proposed algorithm detects and prevents the Sybil attack in the WSN.

Keywords: Immune Collaborative Model, WSN, Security Challenges, Sybil Attack.

1. Introduction

A Wireless sensor network is a network of distributed autonomous devices that can sense or monitor physical or environmental conditions cooperatively [1]. Typically, sensor nodes are grouped in clusters, and each cluster has a node that acts as the cluster head. All nodes forward their

sensor data to the cluster head, which in turn routes it to a specialized node called sink node (or base station) through a multi-hop wireless communication. Sensors must be deployed before they can provide useful data. Therefore the deployment of sensors is an important basis for sensor networking. One of the important criteria for being able to deploy an efficient sensor network is to find optimal node deployment strategies and efficient topology control techniques. [3]

WSNs are used in numerous applications such as environmental monitoring, habitat monitoring, prediction and detection of natural calamities, medical monitoring and structural health monitoring [2]. WSNs consist of a large number of small, inexpensive, disposable and autonomous sensor nodes that are generally deployed in an ad hoc manner in vast geographical areas for remote operations. Sensor nodes are severely constrained in terms of storage resources, computational capabilities, communication bandwidth and power supply.

2. Security Challenge in WSN

Security has become a challenge in wireless sensor networks. Low capabilities of devices, in terms of computational power and energy consumption, make difficult using traditional security protocols. Two main problems related to security protocols arise. Firstly, the overload that security protocols introduce in messages should be reduced at a minimum; every bit the sensor sends consumes energy and, consequently, reduces the life of the device. Secondly, low computational power implies that special cryptographic algorithms that require less

powerful processors need to be used. The combination of both problems leads us to a situation where new approaches or solutions to security protocols need to be considered. Wireless links in WSNs are susceptible to eavesdropping, impersonating, message distorting etc. Poorly protected nodes that move into hostile environments can be easily compromised. Administration becomes more difficult due to dynamic topology. Various security challenges in wireless sensor networks are analyzed and key issues that need to be resolved for achieving adequate security are summarized in [5]. Types of routing attacks and their countermeasures are represented in [6]. A review of security threats to WSNs and a survey of defense mechanisms is presented in [7].

In order to design a secure sensor network, several aspects have to be considered [8]: Key establishment and trust setup, secrecy and authentication, and privacy. Key establishment can be considered the base of the system; a secure and efficient key distribution mechanism is needed for large scale sensor networks. Once every node has its own keys, these are used to authenticate and encrypt (if needed) the messages they exchange.

2.1 Sybil attack

When any node creates multiple copies of itself to create confusion in the WSN network or illegally claims multiple identities or claims fake IDs and also can cause collapse in the network then that kind of situation can be referred as Sybil attack. This system can attack both internally and externally in which external attacks can be restricted by authentication but not internal attacks. As there is one to one mapping between identity and entity in WSN network, this Sybil attack violates it by creating multiple identities [9].




Figure1: Sybil Attack

As it is shown in figure nodes A, B, C and D are Sybil nodes and they can communicate with any of the neighboring nodes and have multiple identities and thus confuse and collapse the network.

2.2 Types of Sybil attack

There are different types of Sybil attack as mentioned below [10]:

2.2.1 Direct and Indirect Communication

In direct communication the communication is between the legal node and the Sybil node while in indirect communication it is between the legal node and the copy of the Sybil node.

2.2.2 Stolen and Fabricated Identities

Stolen identity is that identity which the malicious node takes from the legitimate node and uses of attack. This kind of cannot be identified and find if the legitimate node is destroyed. While fabricated identities are that identities that the copy node or the malicious node takes from the legitimate node or we can say uses the exact same identity as that of the legitimate node. This is known as identity replication in which same identity is used many times in a same network.

2.2.3 Simultaneous and Non-Simultaneous Attack

In simultaneous attack, all the copy nodes or the Sybil identities participate at the same time, but since they have only one identity so this simultaneous attack is supported by the cycling of identities between all nodes. Non-simultaneous is that in which the attacker uses the same number of the identities equal to number of devices.

2.3 Sybil Attacks on Protocols

In Sybil attack, as the malicious code can generate and uses a number of identities on single device than that can create an illusion as if there are a number of legitimate nodes and thus can affect important protocols.

2.3.1 Distributed Storage

As the Sybil attack creates copy of nodes then the replicated data can be stored in several nodes and thus affect the architecture.

2.3.2 Routing

As one node can be present in a number of routes because of having same identity to a number of malicious nodes, routing mechanism is affected.

2.3.3 Data Aggregation

As Sybil nodes contribute many times posing as a number of different users, the aggregated data changes completely, as the data is grouped completely into one node and thus false information occurs.

2.3.4 Voting

As the decisions in the WSN are mainly done by voting, so the Sybil node can vote many times from the malicious nodes and thus destroyed the process.

2.3.5 Misbehavior Detection

Detecting accuracy of the malicious node is reduced as the Sybil node uses its virtual identities to increase its credit trust vales and reputation.

2.3.6 Fair resource Allocation

Because of the multiple identities, Sybil node affects the allocation of the resource as it have virtual identities, it can obtain an unfair share of resources.

3. Artificial Immune System

The Biological Immune System (BIS) is the one of the most complicated structure and peculiar function system in biological bodies. It is composed of organs, tissues, cells and molecules with immune function. The main action of BIS is to recognize the body's own cells (self) and antigens (non-self), and exclude non-self. The further researches of BIS showed that the performing process of biological immune contains the powerful information processing

capabilities, such as recognition, learning, memory, diversity, fault tolerance, distributed detection and so on. Recently, these characteristics of BIS have drawn significant attention. Numerous scholars have come to imitate the mechanism of BIS to apply it to the other fields. All these artificial intelligent system, inspired by immune system, are called the Artificial Immune System (AIS) [11, 12].

Artificial Immune System (AIS) is a framework based upon a set of general-purpose algorithms and models to create abstract components of the immune system. The diversity and self-adaptive characteristics of AIS make it remarkable in anomaly detection. Especially it has the ability to detect unknown intrusions.

By simulating the biological immunity, the AIS can offer much evolutionary learning mechanism, such as unsupervised learning, self-organizing, memory etc, and it draws the advantages of Classifier, Neuro-Network and Machine Reasoning, therefore it is considered a great potential to solve problems with new ideas and methods, which maybe can be applied to control theory and control engineering. The research results of AIS relate to cybernation, pattern recognition, fault diagnosis, information Security, intelligent optimizing, machine learning, robotology, data analysis as well as other fields. In the last ten years, the AIS is gaining popularity, and has become another hot topic of Artificial Intelligence, following after Fuzzy Logic, Neuro Network and Gene Algorithm.

4. Mapping of Immune System with Network

Following table represents different parameter of immune system mapped with the network parameter of the WSN.

Immune System	Network Parameter
Antibodies	Detectors
Antigens	Malicious Node
Self	Normal Activity
Non-self	Abnormal Activity

Figure2: Immune System and N/w Parameters

5. Architecture of Immune Collaborative Body

The weak points of AIS prevent it from presenting efficient protection. On the other hand, if the Artificial Immune Systems in WSN with similar environments share their lymphocytes, the conflict between efficiency of AIS. Such a model for lymphocytes sharing is called Collaborative Artificial Immune System, and it is implemented by the structure called Immune Collaborative Body. In order to keep the diversity of immune system, Immune Bodies can join an Immune Collaborative Bodies freely, and only some efficient memory lymphocytes can be shared. It is a virtual system the function of which is to organize similar immune bodies. The ICB is made up of IB (immune body) and IC (immune channel).

$ICB = \{IB_i, IC \mid I \in N\}$, N is the set of natural numbers, that is to say, ICB include several IBs and the amount is user defined. IB is an integral immune system which is installed in network equipment.

5.1 Modules of Immune Body

There are five typical modules in IB, Collaborative module, Immune algorithm, Collaborative Detector Lib, Memory Detector Lib, Mature Detector Lib. Functions of these modules are:

5.1.1 Collaborative Module

Send and receive collaborative detectors, maintain the information of ICB, decide which collaboration to join in and when to quit.

5.1.2 Immune Algorithm

The function of this module is to run immune algorithms, such as negative selection algorithm, clonal selection algorithm and so on. Mature detectors are generated from these algorithms. The clonal selection algorithm is applied on the proposed model.

5.1.3 Mature Detector Lib

Store mature detectors generated by immune algorithms.

5.1.4 Memory Detector Lib

Efficient mature detectors are stored as memory detectors in this lib with longer life circle.

5.1.5 Collaborative Detector Lib

Efficient memory detectors are selected as collaborative detectors and spread to the whole ICB.

5.2 Function of Immune Collaborative Model for WSN

Collaborative module is the main part of the immune body. In order to find out the immune bodies similar with oneself necessary information is stored in the module such as:

5.2.1 Immune Body IP

In order to sign an immune body uniquely.

5.2.2 Immune Body Characteristics

In order to compare with each other to select the similar ones, various characteristics included are node type, coverage area, packet size, initial energy, energy consumed, and residual energy.

- i) Node type will be 1, 2, 3 as the network consists of 3 type of nodes.
- ii) Coverage area: Coverage area of different type of node is different. This property will include coverage area of node.
- iii) Packet size: It gives size of packet to be transmitted.
- iv) Initial energy: It gives initial energy of the node.
- v) Energy consumed: It gives the total energy consumed by the node.
- vi) Residual energy: It gives the remaining energy of the node. If the remaining energy is 0 then the node is dead.

5.2.3 ICB ID

It is used to sign ICB the immune body belongs to, uniquely.

5.2.4 ICB Characteristics

In order to be compared by other immune body to decide whether to join this ICB or not, these characteristics are:

- i) Number of nodes: It gives the number of nodes in the ICB.
- ii) Head node id: It tells about the id of the head node of the ICB.
- iii) Head node residual energy: specifies the residual energy of the head node after joining immune body to the ICB.
- iv) Threshold energy: It gives the maximum level of the energy of any node.
- v) Threshold delay: It defines the threshold delay in every node in the ICB.
- vi) Max size: It specifies the limit of the maximum size or the maximum number of nodes an ICB can have.

5.2.5 Search criteria

When an immune body wants to join an ICB, it will compare ICB characteristics with its own immune body characteristics based on the search criteria and also can be set by the users.

5.2.6 Exit rule

Prescribe the condition to exit an ICB.

IB-ID		
IB-characteristic		
Node type	Coverage area	Packet size
Initial energy	Energy consumed	Residual energy
ICB-ID		
ICB-characteristic		
Number of nodes	Head node id	Head node residual energy
Threshold energy	Threshold delay	Max size
Search criteria		
Exit Rule		

Figure3: ICB model for WSN

6. Algorithm of Collaboration

Algorithm of collaboration includes 3 phases, join in collaborative body, collaboration, and quit collaborative body.

1. Join in collaborative body

1.1. New entrant side

- 1.1.1. Broadcast the Search Criteria
- 1.1.2. if (number of ICB satisfy the Search Criteria \geq 1) then:
- 1.1.3. Choose qualified ICB randomly
- 1.1.4. Modify the ICB.ID=chosen ICB.ID
- 1.1.5. Insert this. IB.IP in contribution table
- 1.1.6. broadcast ICB.ID
- 1.1.7. end/
- 1.1.8. else if(no of ICB satisfy the Search Criteria $<$ 1) then:
- 1.1.9. ICB.ID=this.IB.IP+this.time // build a new ICB
- 1.1.10. Insert this.IB.IP in contribution table
- 1.1.11. broadcast ICB.ID
- 1.1.12. end

1.2. Other IBs of the ICB

- 1.2.1. BEGIN
- 1.2.2. receive broadcast Search Criteria
- 1.2.3. if(this.IB.characteristics==Search Criteria)
- 1.2.4. Insert source.IB.IP in contribution table
- 1.2.5. else
- 1.2.6. discarded broadcast package
- 1.2.7. END

2. Collaboration

2.1. Be helped side

- 2.1.1. int k //successfully detect, the lifecircle of detector +k
- 2.1.2. int h //unsuccessfully detect, the lifecircle of detector -k
- 2.1.3. receive broadcast CD
- 2.1.4. insert detector in Collaborative Detector Lib

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2.1.5. while(amount of nodes in
        collaborative model<=threshold )
        then:
2.1.6.   if(collaborative detector
        matches antigen) then:
2.1.7.   this.CD.lifecircle=this.CD.
        lifecircle+k
2.1.8.   this.CD.contribution=valu
        e++
2.1.9.   reply sender "ok"
2.1.10.  end// CD is a structure of
        Collaborative Detector
2.1.11.  else
2.1.12.  this.CD.lifecircle=
        this.CD.lifecircle -h;
2.2. helping side
2.2.1.   while(no of nodes in
        memory <=threshold )
2.2.2.   Repeat
2.2.3.   if(memory_detector.lifecir
        cle>threshold delay)
2.2.4.   memory detector becomes
        CD
2.2.5.   broadcast CD
2.2.6.   end
2.2.7.   if(received "ok")
2.2.8.   this.CD.contribution_value
        ++
2.2.9.   END
3. Exit ICB
3.1. Exiting side
3.1.1.  int sum= $\sum$ Contribution
        values
3.1.2.  if(sum<1) then:
3.1.3.  delete ICB.ID
3.1.4.  broadcast exit ICB.ID

3.2. Other IBs of the ICB
3.2.1.  received broadcast
3.2.2.  delete IB.IP
    
```

7. Proposed Algorithm

The proposed algorithm applies the Sybil attack detection and recovery using the proposed immune

collaborative model. The Network consists of 20 nodes and Network is heterogeneous and 3 types of nodes are available in network. The whole process can be explained by the following algorithm:

1. Select the source and destination.
2. Apply immune collaborative model on the network and the immune algorithm is clonal selection algorithm.
3. The algorithm replicates the node identities and different IB joins and exits different ICB.
4. Transmit data from source towards destination.
5. While(data doesn't received by the destination)
6. Repeat
7. Different IB joins and exit ICB
8. If(IB-ID is not unique)
9. Then Sybil attack detected.
10. IB characteristics are modified and IB exists from ICB.
11. End if
12. End while
13. Exit

8. Simulation

The simulation is performed on the MATLAB and the various parameters like end 2 end delays and packet delivery ratio are analyzed. The immune algorithm parameter is the objective function. The simulation results in pdr 99% and the end 2 end delay is 1.5 ms. The Objective function is minimized by using the number of iteration and the plot shows the result.




Figure4: Graphical Representation

9. Conclusion and Future Scope

This paper proposes a model immune collaborative model in WSN and applies the mode to detect and recover from the Sybil attack. The proposed model can detect the Sybil node and recover it effectively. The packet delivery ratio has been improved to 99% and the network detects the attack quickly and recovery is also done quickly. In future the proposed model can be applied to detect and recover other attacks in the WSN and the model can be used to detect the same attack using different immune algorithm.

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